6.
In its Report, circulated to Members of the World Trade Organization (the "WTO") on WT/DS192/AB/R Page 3 (c) Inconsistently with its obligations under Articles 6.2 and 6.4, the United States did not demonstrate that the subject imports caused an "actual threat" of serious damage to the domestic industry. 6 (footnote omitted)
7.
The Panel further concluded that:
(a) Pakistan did not establish that the US determination of serious damage was not justified based on the data used by the US investigating authority.
(b) Pakistan did not establish that the US determination of serious damage was not justified regarding the evaluation by the US investigating authority of establishments that ceased producing combed cotton yarn.
(c) Pakistan did not establish that the US determinations of serious damage and causation thereof were not justified based upon an inappropriately chosen period of investigation and period of incidence of serious damage and causation thereof. the United States filed its appellant's submission. 10 On 3 August 2001, Pakistan filed its appellee's submission. 11 On the same day, the European Communities and India each filed a third participant's submission.
12
6 Panel Report, para. 8.1. 7 Ibid., para. 8.2(a), (b) and (c). 8 Ibid., para. 8.3. 9 Ibid., para. 8.5. 10 Pursuant to Rule 21 of the Working Procedures.
Pursuant to Rule 22 of the Working Procedures.
12 Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Working Procedures.
10.
The oral hearing in the appeal was held on 16 August 2001. The participants and third participants presented oral arguments and responded to questions put to them by the Members of the Division hearing the appeal.
II. Arguments of the Participants and Third Participants
A.
Claims of Error by the United States -Appellant

Standard of Review
11.
The United States claims that the Panel erred and exceeded the mandate of WTO dispute settlement panels set forth in Article 11 of the DSU by finding that, in assessing the conformity of a transitional safeguard measure with Article 6 of the ATC, it could consider evidence that was not in existence at the time of the competent authority's determination.
12.
In the United States' view, the Panel misinterpreted the standard of review applicable to its assessment of the conformity of the transitional safeguard measure at issue with Article 6 of the ATC.
In challenges to a transitional safeguard measure, the question before a panel is whether the determination, at the time it was made, was consistent with the requirements of Article 6 of the ATC.
Such an assessment can be made only on the basis of facts in existence at that time. Examining a Member's determination on the basis of evidence that did not exist at that time would permit panels to strike down the determination of the competent authority for failing to anticipate facts that could emerge in the future. The United States argues that such a review would not be an "objective assessment" of the matter at issue, but would instead constitute a de novo review.
13.
The United States submits that WTO jurisprudence strongly supports limiting a panel's consideration of evidence to that in existence at the time the competent authority made its
determination. For instance, the panel in United States -Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool
Shirts and Blouses from India ("United States -Shirts and Blouses "), an ATC dispute, found that an objective assessment must be based on facts in existence at the time of the determination. 13 The panels that reviewed the consistency of safeguard measures under the Agreement on Safeguards in
Korea -Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products ("Korea -Dairy
13 Panel Report, WT/DS33/R, adopted 23 May 1997, as upheld by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS33/AB/R and Corr.1, DSR 1997:I, 343, para. 7.21.
Safeguard ") and United States -Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities ("United States -Wheat Gluten Safeguard ")
14 reached a similar conclusion.
14. The United States argues that, contrary to the Panel's reasoning, the finding of the panel in
Argentina -Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear ("Argentina -Footwear Safeguard ") that a panel may have to consider the raw information from which the data to be scrutinized were compiled, does not support the Panel's conclusion. 15 The Panel sought to distinguish between relying on postdetermination evidence to (i) reinvestigate the market situation and (ii) evaluate the "thoroughness and sufficiency" of the "investigation" of the competent authority. Such a distinction might at most, and in limited circumstances, justify consideration of the underlying data used to support a determination. 16 15.
The United States also submits that the Panel implied that "subsequent developments" could be treated differently from post-determination evidence and, unlike post-determination evidence, "subsequent developments" could not be taken into account by a panel. There is, however, no meaningful distinction between those two categories, as information concerning neither would have been available to the competent authority at the time it made its determination.
The United States claims that the Panel further erred in relying on what it perceived to be
certain deficiencies in the ATC, notably the absence of a right of exporting Members to participate in the national investigation prior to the determination, to justify its consideration of post-determination evidence. Under Article 11 of the DSU, the extent of a panel's review is circumscribed by the text of the agreement it is reviewing. Articles 6.7 and 6.10 of the ATC provide exporting Members ample opportunity to contest the fact-finding and determination of the importing Member on a bilateral and multilateral basis.
17.
The United States further argues that under the ATC, evidence that came into existence after the competent authority's determination may be considered by the TMB pursuant to Article 6.10 of the ATC. WTO dispute settlement panels have a more limited mandate than the TMB, as confirmed by the panel in United States -Shirts and Blouses.
17
14 Panel Report, Korea -Dairy Safeguard, WT/DS98/R and Corr.1, adopted 12 January 2000, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS98/AB/R, para. 7.30; Panel Report, United States -Wheat Gluten Safeguard , WT/DS166/R, adopted 19 January 2001, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS166/AB/R, para. 8. 6 . 15 Panel Report, WT/DS121/R, adopted 12 January 2000, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS121/AB/R, para. 8. 126 . 16 United States' appellant's submission, para. 18.
18.
In conclusion, the United States claims that if WTO dispute settlement panels were allowed to review a competent authority's determination on the basis of newly available evidence, competent authorities would be held responsible for facts unknown or unknowable at the time of their determinations. Under such circumstances, the United States submits, it would be impossible for a
Member to make a determination that would withstand a panel review and respond in a timely manner to the damaging effects of an import surge, thus seriously impairing the transitional safeguard mechanism guaranteed by Article 6 of the ATC. States, the ATC permits the importing Member to define the domestic industry as the industry producing a product that was both like and directly competitive with the imported product.
Vertically integrated fabric producers manufactured yarn that was like, but that was not directly competitive with the imported yarn, because the yarn produced by them was for their own consumption and was not destined "for sale" in the merchant market. Therefore, the United States' identification of the domestic industry, in this case, as the producers of yarn "for sale" in the merchant market, was consistent with the ATC.
20.
The United States submits that the Panel, in rejecting its domestic industry definition, disregarded the ordinary meaning of the connector "and/or" expressly used in Article 6.2 of the ATC and, contrary to customary rules of treaty interpretation, reduced the meaning of the term "and" to inutility. The Panel found that the phrase "like and/or directly competitive products" means: (i) every like product; (ii) every directly competitive product; and (iii) any overlap between the two. The Panel interpreted Article 6.2 as if it read "like or directly competitive", completely writing out the word "and" from the Article. The United States contends that the combination of the connectors "and/or" generally means "either together or as an alternative", and allows a range of industry identifications, including the one that it chose in this case.
21.
The United States also submits that the Panel ignored customary rules of treaty interpretation by referring first to other WTO agreements rather than to the ATC itself in analyzing the context of 
37.
Finally, Pakistan points out that, in contrast to other WTO agreements providing for safeguards or contingency protection, the ATC does not establish any specific requirements for public notice and comment during the investigation. In the case of many safeguard measures under Article 6, there will be evidence that only the exporting Member can furnish (for instance, its own statistics on recent exports) and that is, therefore, not "available" to the competent authority, under the procedures it is permitted to follow under the ATC. There will also be evidence that only the exporting Member has an interest in generating (such as precise data on plant closures) and which was, therefore, not "in existence" at the time of the investigation. If the United States' contentions were accepted, such evidence could be submitted, neither before the competent authority, nor before a panel, even though such evidence may be crucial or decisive in determining the conformity of a safeguard measure with the substantive requirements of Article 6.
Definition of the Domestic Industry
38.
Pakistan submits that the Panel correctly interpreted the phrase "like and/or directly competitive products". According to the ordinary meaning of these words, the domestic industry to be examined includes all domestic manufacturers that produce: (i) a product "like" the imported product; (ii) a product directly competitive with the imported product; or (iii) both a product that is "like", and a product that is directly competitive, with the imported product. Pakistan contends that with such an interpretation, the term "and" is given meaning and effect and is, contrary to the assertions of the United States, not reduced to inutility.
39.
Pakistan also submits that vertically integrated producers manufacturing yarn for internal consumption, rather than for sale on the merchant market, cannot be excluded from the domestic industry. The interpretation of the term "to produce", suggested by the United States, implying that vertically integrated fabric producers are part of the fabric  not yarn  industry, cannot be reconciled with the purpose of Article 6.2 of the ATC. An establishment producing yarn for processing into fabric can suffer damage both as a result of rising yarn imports and as a result of rising fabric imports. Article 6.2 is meant to permit safeguard action in both situations. However, no safeguard measure could be imposed to protect vertically integrated establishments if the yarn they manufacture for internal consumption were not "produced" in the sense of Article 6.2 as contended by the United States. Pakistan adds that the United States' interpretation of the term "producing" would, in effect, as the Panel correctly found, equate "producing" with "selling". Alcoholic Beverages, the Appellate Body noted that the dictionary meaning of the term "competitive"
is "characterised by competition", and concluded therefrom that products are competitive if they are interchangeable on the market. In examining whether a product is competitive, both latent and extant demand must, therefore, be considered. 
41.
Pakistan further submits that the Panel correctly rejected the contention of the United States that fabric producers which manufacture the yarn they consume are hermetically segregated from the merchant market for yarn. Fabric processed from captively produced yarn is sold on the same market as fabric processed from yarn purchased on the merchant market. A company that owns both a yarn plant and a fabric plant, therefore, cannot ignore the opportunity costs of manufacturing yarn.
According to Pakistan, the yarn produced internally and the yarn available on the merchant market are thus, actually, in a competitive relationship.
42. In Pakistan's view, the United States' interpretation of the term "and/or" fails to give meaning and effect to all the terms of the ATC. The United States' interpretation would give Members the right to define the domestic industry, inter alia, as the producers of "like but not directly competitive products". Pakistan submits that the drafters of the ATC would not have provided for such a meaningless alternative under which the requirement of causation could never be met, given the lack of competitive relationship to the surging "like" imports. 
48.
Pakistan further argues that Articles 6.1 and 6.6 of the ATC do not support the "pick-and- 51.
In conclusion, Pakistan submits that Article 6.4 of the ATC does not allow importing
Members to attribute damage to one Member only, because that Member would then suffer a disproportionate share of the effect of the safeguard measure. An appropriate attribution analysis must result in a restraint that is distributed appropriately to all Members whose exports have caused the serious damage. According to Pakistan, the Panel correctly found that an ability to "pick and choose" would be the least consistent with a most-favoured-nation approach and thus the least conducive to the progressive integration of the textiles and clothing sector into the GATT 1994. C.
Arguments of the Third Participants
European Communities
52.
In its third participant's submission, the European Communities confines itself to the question of permissible evidence and submits that a panel's review concerns the work of the competent authority at the time of its determination.
53.
The European Communities argues that panels are not empowered to evaluate the work of the competent authority on the basis of evidence that was objectively not available, for example, not in existence, at the time of the determination. This would go beyond the "independent duty of investigation" of the competent authority, which clearly cannot be asked to take into account what is not reasonably available to it while conducting a proper and thorough investigation. However, the European Communities considers that there may be cases where a panel needs to consider evidence that comes into existence after the competent authority's determination, in order to examine the sufficiency and thoroughness of the investigation. As an example, the European Communities refers to a statement from a statistical agency, dated after the investigation, to the effect that it could have produced reliable import statistics if asked, but that it was not.
The European Communities emphasizes that, despite the irrelevance of information
objectively not available at the time of the determination to assess the WTO-consistency of that determination, panels should strictly scrutinize the accuracy of the competent authority's investigation. This scrutiny is all the more necessary for safeguard measures taken under the ATC, since that Agreement does not provide for any right to seek removal of a measure that has been adopted without the necessary conditions being fulfilled. In the European Communities' view, this means, for example, that panels should review whether the competent authority seriously tried to verify data which did not come from official sources. 
III. Issues Raised in this Appeal
61.
This appeal raises the following issues: [W]e shall not examine any evidence for the purpose of reinvestigating the market situation, but we should examine any evidence, without regard to whether it was available or considered at the time of investigation, for the purpose of evaluating the thoroughness and sufficiency of the investigation underpinning the decision of the US authority. (footnote omitted, emphasis added) … Accordingly, in our view, the 1998 calendar year US Census data should be examined by the Panel, even though they were not available to the US government at the time of investigation, in order to confirm whether the reliance by the US investigation authority on the AYSA data is justifiable. 37 We note that the participants agree with the Panel that panels cannot consider "developments" subsequent to the determination. (Ibid., footnote 190 to para. 7.33) 38 The United States stresses that the question "whether a panel may consider evidence that might have been available to the national authority at the time of the determination but was not considered", is not before the Appellate Body. (United States' appellant's submission, para. 9) 39 In this dispute, we are dealing with evidence in the form of data that had not been compiled at the time of the determination and, hence, could not have been known. We do not rule on other kinds of evidence.
68.
Article 11 of the DSU lays down the standard of review for panels in disputes under the covered agreements 40 in the following terms:
[A] panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. … (emphasis added)
69.
We have considered this standard of review on several occasions. summarized as follows: panels must examine whether the competent authority has evaluated all relevant factors; they must assess whether the competent authority has examined all the pertinent facts and assessed whether an adequate explanation has been provided as to how those facts support the determination; and they must also consider whether the competent authority's explanation addresses fully the nature and complexities of the data and responds to other plausible interpretations of the data. However, panels must not conduct a de novo review of the evidence nor substitute their judgement for that of the competent authority.
75.
Turning to the application of Article 11 of the DSU in the context of the ATC, we recall that Article 6.2 of that Agreement provides as follows:
Safeguard action may be taken under this Article when, on the basis of a determination by a Member, it is demonstrated that a particular product is being imported into its territory in such increased quantities as to cause serious damage, or actual threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing like and/or directly competitive products. (footnote omitted, emphasis added)
76.
Unlike Article 3 of the Agreement on Safeguards, which provides explicitly for an investigation by competent authorities of a Member, Article 6 of the ATC does not specify either the organ or the procedure through which a Member makes its "determination". Nevertheless, the above principles concerning the standard of review under Article 11 of the DSU with respect to the Agreement on Safeguards apply equally, in our view, to a panel's review of a Member's determination under Article 6 of the ATC. We note that Article 6 does not require the participation of all interested parties in the process leading to the determination. We consider, therefore, that the exercise of due diligence by a Member is all the more important in reaching a determination under Article 6 of the ATC. 48 Appellate Body Report, supra, footnote 41, para. 55. 49 Ibid.
77.
The exercise of due diligence by a Member cannot imply, however, the examination of evidence that did not exist and that, therefore, could not possibly have been taken into account when the Member made its determination. The demonstration by a Member that a particular product is being imported into its territory in such increased quantities as to cause serious damage (or actual threat thereof) to the domestic industry can be based only on facts and evidence which existed at the time the determination was made. The urgent nature of such an investigation may not permit the Member to delay its determination in order to take into account evidence that might be available only at a future date. Even a determination on the existence of threat of serious injury must be based on projections extrapolating from existing data. importing Members under Article 6 to take transitional safeguard action when the determination demonstrates the fulfilment of the specific conditions provided for in this Article. 50 See, United States -Lamb Safeguard, where we said as follows:
As facts, by their very nature, pertain to the present and the past, the occurrence of future events can never be definitively proven by facts. There is, therefore, a tension between a future-oriented "threat" analysis, which, ultimately, calls for a degree of "conjecture" about the likelihood of a future event, and the need for a fact-based determination. Safeguard action may be taken under this Article when, on the basis of a determination by a Member, it is demonstrated that a particular product is being imported into its territory in such increased quantities as to cause serious damage, or actual threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing like and/or directly competitive products. (footnote omitted, emphasis added)
86.
A plain reading of the phrase "domestic industry producing like and/or directly competitive products" shows clearly that the terms "like" and "directly competitive" are characteristics attached to the domestic products that are to be compared with the imported product. We are, therefore, of the view that the definition of the domestic industry must be product-oriented and not producer-oriented, and that the definition must be based on the products 56 produced by the domestic industry which are to be compared with the imported product in terms of their being like or directly competitive. 57 
87.
We also consider that the term "producing" in Article 6.2 means producing for commercial purposes and that it cannot be interpreted, in itself, to be limited to or qualified as producing for sale on the merchant or any other segment of the market. The definition of the domestic industry, in terms of Article 6.2, is determined by what the industry produces, that is, like and/or directly competitive products. In our view, the term "producing", in itself, cannot be given a different or a qualified meaning on the basis of what a domestic producer chooses to do with its product. 56 In United States -Lamb Safeguard, we also found that the product defines the scope of the definition of the domestic industry under the Agreement on Safeguards. In that case, the "like" product at issue was lamb meat. (Appellate Body Report, supra, footnote 41, paras. 84, 86-88 and 95) 57 At this stage, we analyze the terms "like" and "directly competitive" in isolation. For the interpretation of the connectors "and/or" in Article 6.2, see, infra, paragraph 104.
88.
We now turn to the next two components of the definition of the domestic industry under Article 6.2 of the ATC, namely, like products and directly competitive products.
89.
We note that there is no disagreement between the participants 58 that yarn imported from Pakistan and yarn produced by the producers of the United States, regardless of whether they are vertically integrated fabric producers or independent yarn producers, are like products. The United
States has made it clear in its arguments 59 that its exclusion of yarn produced by vertically integrated fabric producers from the definition of the domestic industry was not because they are not producing a like product, but because they are not producing a directly competitive product. It is, therefore, not necessary for us to address the meaning of the term "like products" for the purposes of this appeal.
90.
Before we examine the term "directly competitive" in the specific context of Article 6.2 and the facts of this particular case, we consider it useful to recall our interpretation of this term on previous occasions.
We have interpreted the term "directly competitive " in Korea -Alcoholic Beverages 60 and
Japan -Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages.
61
We are cognizant of the fact that these two reports interpreted this term in the context of the Interpretative Note Ad Article III:2 of the GATT 1994. We will refer to this aspect later. The key elements of the interpretation of the term "directly competitive"
in our Report in Korea -Alcoholic Beverages are:
(a) The word "competitive" means "characterised by competition". The context of the competitive relationship is necessarily the marketplace, since that is the forum where consumers choose different products that offer alternative ways of satisfying a particular need or taste. As competition in the marketplace is a dynamic and evolving process, the competitive relationship between products is not to be analyzed exclusively by current consumer preferences 62 ; the competitive relationship extends as well to potential competition.
63
58 Panel Report, para. 7.41. 59 United States' appellant's submission, paras. 33 ff.
60 Appellate Body Report, supra, footnote 20, paras. 108-124. 61 Appellate Body Report, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:I, 97, at 117-118.
62 Supra, footnote 20, paras. 114-115. 63 Ibid., paras. 115 and 117.
(b) According to the ordinary meaning of the term "directly competitive", products are competitive or substitutable when they are interchangeable or if they offer alternative ways of satisfying a particular need or taste.
(c)
In the context of Article III:2, second sentence, the qualifying word "directly" in the Ad Article suggests a degree of proximity in the competitive relationship between the domestic and imported products. The word "directly" does not, however, prevent a consideration of both latent and extant demand.
65
(d) "Like" products are a subset of directly competitive or substitutable products: all like products are, by definition, directly competitive or substitutable products, whereas not all "directly competitive or substitutable" products are "like". of the GATT 1994), and in a different factual setting. In particular, the word "substitutable" is not used in juxtaposition with "directly competitive" in Article 6.2 of the ATC. Second, the Appellate Body emphasized, in that case, the importance of the marketplace in judging the competitive relationship between products because that is the forum where consumers choose between different products. According to the United States, a proper reading of the Appellate Body's reasoning reveals that if a domestic product does not enter the marketplace at all, it cannot be regarded as being "directly competitive" with the imported product, even though the two products may admittedly be "like products".
93.
We are not persuaded by these arguments of the United States with respect to the relevance and interpretation of our Report in Korea -Alcoholic Beverages.
94.
With respect to the first argument of the United States, a careful reading of our Report in that case would show that we used the terms "directly competitive" and "directly substitutable" without implying any distinction between them in assessing the competitive relationship between products.
67
We do not consider that the mere absence of the word "substitutable" in Article 6.2 of the ATC renders our interpretation of the term "directly competitive" under Article III:2 of the GATT 1994
64 Supra, footnote 20, para. 115. 65 Ibid., para. 116. 66 Ibid., para. 118. 67 See, ibid., paras. 114-116.
irrelevant in terms of its contextual significance for the interpretation of that term under Article 6.2 of the ATC.
95.
We now turn to an examination of the term "directly competitive" in the specific context of Article 6.2 of the ATC and the dispute before us. We must bear in mind that Article 6.2 permits a safeguard action to be taken in order to protect a domestic industry from serious damage (or actual threat thereof) caused by a surge in imports, provided the domestic industry is identified as the industry producing "like and/or directly competitive products" in comparison with the imported product. The criteria of "like" and "directly competitive" are characteristics attached to the domestic product in order to ensure that the domestic industry is the appropriate industry in relation to the imported product. The degree of proximity between the imported and domestic products in their competitive relationship is thus critical to underpin the reasonableness of a safeguard action against an imported product.
96.
According to the ordinary meaning of the term "competitive", two products are in a competitive relationship if they are commercially interchangeable, or if they offer alternative ways of satisfying the same consumer demand in the marketplace. "Competitive" is a characteristic attached to a product and denotes the capacity of a product to compete both in a current or a future situation.
The word "competitive" must be distinguished from the words "competing" or "being in actual competition". It has a wider connotation than "actually competing" and includes also the notion of a potential to compete. It is not necessary that two products be competing, or that they be in actual competition with each other, in the marketplace at a given moment in order for those products to be regarded as competitive. Indeed, products which are competitive may not be actually competing with each other in the marketplace at a given moment for a variety of reasons, such as regulatory restrictions or producers' decisions. Thus, a static view is incorrect, for it leads to the same products being regarded as competitive at one moment in time, and not so the next, depending upon whether or not they are in the marketplace.
97.
It is significant that the word "competitive" is qualified by the word "directly", which emphasizes the degree of proximity that must obtain in the competitive relationship between the products under comparison. As noted earlier, a safeguard action under the ATC is permitted in order to protect the domestic industry against competition from an imported product. To ensure that such protection is reasonable, it is expressly provided that the domestic industry must be producing "like"
and/or "directly competitive products". Like products are, necessarily, in the highest degree of competitive relationship in the marketplace. 68 In permitting a safeguard action, the first consideration is, therefore, whether the domestic industry is producing a like product as compared with the imported product in question. If this is so, there can be no doubt as to the reasonableness of the safeguard action against the imported product.
98.
When, however, the product produced by the domestic industry is not a "like product" as compared with the imported product, the question arises how close should be the competitive relationship between the imported product and the "unlike" domestic product. It is common knowledge that unlike or dissimilar products compete or can compete in the marketplace to varying degrees, ranging from direct or close competition to remote or indirect competition. The more unlike or dissimilar two products are, the more remote or indirect their competitive relationship will be in the marketplace. The term "competitive" has, therefore, purposely been qualified and limited by the word "directly" to signify the degree of proximity that must obtain in the competitive relationship when the products in question are unlike. Under this definition of "directly", a safeguard action will not extend to protecting a domestic industry that produces unlike products which have only a remote or tenuous competitive relationship with the imported product.
99.
We will now examine whether, in this case, yarn produced by the vertically integrated fabric producers of the United States for their own captive consumption is directly competitive with the imported yarn for the purposes of Article 6.2 of the ATC. The United States argues that such yarn is not directly competitive because it is not offered for sale on the market except when the captive production is "out of balance" 69 , and even then only in de minimis quantities. In addition, vertically integrated fabric producers are not dependent on the merchant market for meeting any of their requirements of yarn except to a de minimis extent. In the United States' view, these factors are clearly reflected in the very low and stable rate of yarn sold or purchased by vertically integrated fabric producers to or from the merchant market over the last several years. 70 100.
We are unable to subscribe to this static view which makes the competitive relationship between yarn sold on the merchant market and yarn used for internal consumption by vertically integrated producers dependent on what they choose to do at a particular point in time. 68 Appellate Body Report, Korea -Alcoholic Beverages, supra, footnote 20, para. 118; Appellate Body Report, Canada -Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R, adopted 30 July 1997, DSR 1997:I, 449, at 473. In these cases, we stated that "like" products are perfectly substitutable and that "directly competitive" products are characterized by a high, but imperfect, degree of substitutability. 69 United States' response to questioning at the oral hearing. 70 According to the United States, approximately two percent of captive consumption is purchased from the merchant market and approximately one percent of captive production is sold on the merchant market. (United States' appellant's submission, para. 80) 101 .
If the competitive relationship between the two products is properly considered, it will be clear that they are "directly competitive" within the meaning of that term in Article 6.2. Our view is illustrated by the following considerations:
(a) The vertically integrated fabric producers compete with the independent fabric producers who purchase their requirements of yarn in the merchant market. It is, therefore, unlikely that vertically integrated fabric producers would make their "make-or-buy" decisions with respect to their input of yarn without considering the opportunity cost of doing so. 71 The low and stable rate of their relationship with the merchant market for yarn observed in the past does not imply that the opportunity cost does not enter into their calculations. domestic producer would cease to be directly competitive the moment that producer is taken over by a fabric producer, to the extent the latter transforms this yarn into fabric.
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Likewise, if a vertically integrated fabric producer were to sell its plant producing yarn and that plant were to become an independent producer, the yarn that 71 Panel Report, para. 7.58. 72 See also, ibid., para. 7.64(b). 73 See, ibid., para. 7.64(a).
was previously regarded as non-directly competitive would suddenly become directly competitive.
(d) The approach of the United States would lead to another result which, in our view, cannot be justified. The domestic captive production of yarn by vertically integrated fabric producers would be excluded from the determination of serious damage (or actual threat thereof). However, a safeguard action taken against imported yarn would benefit the vertically integrated fabric producers with respect to the totality of their yarn production, not only with respect to the yarn they sell in the merchant market, but also with respect to yarn they produce for their own consumption. 
102.
The United States also argues that our ruling in United States -Hot-Rolled Steel supports its contention that the captive segment of the market can be separated from the merchant market segment because we observed that captive production was "shielded from direct competition". 74 We did not hold, however, that captive production can be excluded from either the definition of the domestic industry or from the injury analysis. We said that, while an injury analysis can be carried out segment-by-segment before assessing damage to the domestic industry as a whole, an analysis of the captive segment of the market cannot be excluded. Our observation that captive steel production was "shielded from direct competition" did not mean that steel produced in the captive market segment is not directly competitive with imported steel destined for the merchant market. 
103.
For all these reasons, we do not accept the contention of the United States that yarn produced by the vertically integrated fabric producers of the United States is not "directly competitive" with yarn imported from Pakistan.
104.
We now turn to the interpretation of the connectors "and/or" in Article 6.2, on which the participants disagree. 75 We note that the definition of the domestic industry adopted by the United
States in this case would be consistent with Article 6.2 only if we were to find: (i) that captively produced yarn is not directly competitive with imported yarn; and (ii) that the connectors "and/or" in Article 6.2 permit defining the domestic industry on the basis of a product which is not only like but also directly competitive with the imported product. We have reached the conclusion that captively produced yarn is directly competitive with imported yarn sold on the merchant market. We, therefore, do not need to address the interpretation of the connectors "and/or" in Article 6.2.
105.
For all these reasons, we find that combed cotton yarn produced by vertically integrated fabric producers for their internal consumption is "directly competitive" with combed cotton yarn imported 
114.
The first requirement is that the attribution be confined to only those Members from whom imports have shown a sharp and substantial increase. Such Members will be identified on an individual basis by virtue of the wording in Article 6.4, second sentence, "on the basis of a sharp and substantial increase in imports, actual or imminent, from such a Member or Members individually".
(footnote omitted). The Panel interpreted the term "sharp" to refer to the rate of the import increase, and the term "substantial" to the amount of that increase. 85 These interpretations of the Panel have not been appealed and are, therefore, not before us.
115.
The second requirement of Article 6.4, second sentence, is a comparative analysis, in the event that there is more than one Member from whom imports have shown a sharp and substantial increase in its imports. 86 The conduct of the comparative analysis is governed by the latter part of the second sentence of Article 6.4, which requires the analysis to address certain specific factors, namely: (i) the level of imports as compared with imports from other sources; (ii) market share; and (iii) import and domestic prices at a comparable stage of commercial transaction. Article 6.4 further specifies that none of these factors, either alone or combined with other factors, can necessarily give decisive guidance.
116.
The United States argues that Article 6.4, second sentence, permits a comparative analysis of the effect of imports from a particular Member, without conducting a similar kind of analysis for the other Members from whom imports have also increased sharply and substantially.
87
Pakistan contends that such a comparative analysis requires an assessment of the effect of imports from other such Members taken individually.
117.
We note that the wording of Article 6.4, second sentence, does not state expressly how to conduct a comparative analysis of the effects of imports from a particular Member. However, in order to be able to answer this question we have first to address the question why a comparative analysis is required. 85 Panel Report, para. 7.130. 86 We note that the panel in United States -Underwear stressed that such a comparative analysis of the effects of imports is indispensable in attributing serious damage to a Member. The panel noted that, while there had been a significant increase in imports of underwear from Costa Rica, the position of Costa Rica was not significantly different from that of the other five exporting Members considered in the United States' determination. Nonetheless, the determination failed to undertake a comparative assessment of the effects of imports from Costa Rica with those five exporting Members. The panel further reasoned that the United States could not enter into agreements permitting an overall increase of imports of 478 percent over the current import levels from those five Members and, at the same time, claim that an import increase of 22 percent from Costa Rica contributed to serious damage. (Panel Report, supra, footnote 29, paras 7.49 and 7.51) The issue of attribution was not appealed in that case. 87 We note that the United States compared imports from Pakistan only with "total world imports", which included those from Pakistan. See, United States' Market Statement, para. 8.9. 
119.
In consequence, where imports from more than one Member contribute to serious damage, it is only that part of the total damage which is actually caused by imports from such a Member that can be attributed to that Member under Article 6.4, second sentence. Damage that is actually caused to the domestic industry by imports from one Member cannot, in our view, be attributed to a different Member imports from whom were not the cause of that part of the damage. This would amount to a "mis-attribution" of damage and would be inconsistent with the interpretation in good faith of the terms of Article 6.4.
88
Therefore, the part of the total serious damage attributed to an exporting
Member must be proportionate to the damage caused by the imports from that Member. Contrary to the view of the United States, we believe that Article 6.4, second sentence, does not permit the attribution of the totality of serious damage to one Member 89 , unless the imports from that Member alone have caused all the serious damage.
120.
Our view is supported further by the rules of general international law on state responsibility, which require that countermeasures in response to breaches by states of their international obligations be commensurate with the injury suffered. 90 In the same vein, we note that Article 22.4 of the DSU 91 stipulates that the suspension of concessions shall be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment. This provision of the DSU has been interpreted consistently as not justifying punitive 88 See, supra, footnote 53. 89 This position was clearly stated by the United States in its response to questioning at the oral hearing. The level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment.
damages. 92 These two examples illustrate the consequences of breaches by states of their international obligations, whereas a safeguard action is merely a remedy to WTO-consistent "fair trade" activity. 93 It would be absurd if the breach of an international obligation were sanctioned by proportionate countermeasures, while, in the absence of such breach, a WTO Member would be subject to a disproportionate and, hence, "punitive", attribution of serious damage not wholly caused by its exports. In our view, such an exorbitant derogation from the principle of proportionality in respect of the attribution of serious damage could be justified only if the drafters of the ATC had expressly provided for it, which is not the case.
121.
Finally, and most significantly, if the totality of serious damage could be attributed to only one of those Members the imports from whom have contributed to it, there would be no need to undertake a comparative analysis of the effects of imports from that one Member, once the imports from that Member have been found to have increased sharply and substantially; such an interpretation would reduce a whole segment of Article 6.4 to inutility.
122.
We now turn to the question of how to conduct the comparative analysis required by Article 6.4. This analysis is to be seen in the light of the principle of proportionality as the means of determining the scope or assessing the part of the total serious damage that can be attributed to an exporting Member. We recall that Article 6.4 enjoins the importing Member to conduct this comparative analysis on a multi-factor basis including "levels of imports", "market share" and "prices", while specifying that none of these factors alone or in combination with other factors can necessarily give decisive guidance. The comparison is to take place between the effects of imports from the Member in question, on the one hand, and those of imports from other sources, on the other.
The comparison must thus be based on a variety of factors, each of which has a different significance and weight, and is to be measured on a different scale. 
VII. Findings and Conclusions
128.
For the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body: 97 See, supra, paras. 119 and 125-126.
